We propose privacy-preserving protocols for computing linear regression models, in the setting where the training dataset is vertically distributed among several parties. Our main contribution is a hybrid multi-party computation protocol that combines Yao's garbled circuits with tailored protocols for computing inner products. Like many machine learning tasks, building a linear regression model involves solving a system of linear equations. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation and comparison of different techniques for securely performing this task, including a new Conjugate Gradient Descent (CGD) algorithm. This algorithm is suitable for secure computation because it uses an efficient fixed-point representation of real numbers while maintaining accuracy and convergence rates comparable to what can be obtained with a classical solution using floating point numbers. Our technique improves on Nikolaenko et al.'s method for privacy-preserving ridge regression (S&P 2013), and can be used as a building block in other analyses. We implement a complete system and demonstrate that our approach is highly scalable, solving data analysis problems with one million records and one hundred features in less than one hour of total running time.
Introduction
Predictive modeling is an essential tool in decision making processes in domains such as policy making, medicine, law enforcement, and finance. To obtain more accurate models, it is common that organizations cooperate to build joint training datasets, specially when the analysis at hand involves complex phenomena whose study requires vast amounts of data. However, collaborative analyses involving private data are often limited by ethical and regulatory constraints. As an example, consider a research project consisting of a study to predict medical conditions given data related to socio-economic background. While databases holding medical, judicial, and tax records linkable by common unique identifiers (e.g., social security numbers) exist, they are often held by different institutions.
One solution is to rely on a trusted third-party that is provided with the databases from each party in the clear, which then performs the analysis over the data and returns the result to all parties. This approach requires all participants to agree on one party they trust, and poses an obvious privacy threat to the data. Finding effective ways of limiting the amount of trust to be placed on such third-party is an ongoing research challenge being tackled simultaneously from many perspectives.
Our goal is to enable such joint analyses without the need to expose each organization's sensitive data to any other party. We consider a natural setup where parties have incentives to collaborate in obtaining the parameters of a regression model, but are not willing to disclose any information about their data beyond what is revealed by the learned model. Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols provide a general mechanism for multiple parties to jointly compute a function on their private inputs. However, existing out-of-thebox MPC techniques do not yet scale to problem sizes encountered in real-world data analysis applications. The goal of this work is to circumvent such limitations by developing application-specific efficient protocols with better performance than generic MPC techniques.
The motivation to join databases in the medical example above is to build a more accurate model by using a joint training dataset of higher dimensionality than any of the original ones. This is known as data analysis on vertically-partitioned datasets, as the columns (i.e., features) in the training dataset are distributed among several parties. This is in contrast with the horizontally-partitioned setting, where parties produce a joint dataset by contributing rows (i.e., data points) involving a fixed set of features.
Linear regression is a fundamental machine learning task that fits a linear curve over a set of high-dimensional data points. An important property of this problem is that it can be cast as an optimization problem whose solution admits a closed-form expression. Formally, linear regression can be reduced to solving a system of linear equations of the form Aθ = b. Interestingly, solving systems of linear equations is a basic building block of many other machine learning algorithms [54] . Thus, secure MPC solutions for solving linear systems can also be used to develop other privacy-preserving data analysis algorithms.
Contributions. In this paper, we propose a solution for securely computing a linear regression model from a verticallypartitioned dataset distributed among an arbitrary number of parties. Our protocols are the result of securely composing a protocol for privately computing the coefficients of the system of equations Aθ = b from distributed datasets (aggregation phase), and a protocol for securely solving linear systems (solving phase). Our main contributions are as follows: -Scalable MPC protocols for linear regression on vertically partitioned datasets (Section 3) . We design, analyze, and evaluate two hybrid MPC protocols allowing for different trade-offs between running time and the availability of external parties that facilitate the computation. -A fast solver for high-dimensional linear systems suitable for MPC (Section 5). Our solver relies on a new Conjugate Gradient Descent (CGD) algorithm that scales better, both in terms of running time and accuracy, than the best previous MPC-based alternative. -We conduct an extensive evaluation of our system on real data from the UCI repository [46] (Section 6.4). The results show that our system can produce solutions with accuracy comparable to those obtained by standard tools without privacy constraints.
Our work is also the first to undertake a formal analysis of the effect different number representations have on the accuracy of privacy-preserving regression protocols. We further propose a thorough data pre-processing pipeline to mitigate accuracy loss (Section 4). While the basic versions of our protocols are secure against semi-honest adversaries, in Section 7 we discuss extensions of our protocol beyond semi-honest security. We implemented a protocol extension providing stronger security guarantees for the solving phase and observed that it introduces minimal overhead over the semi-honest solution.
Code for our complete system is publicly available under open-source licenses [75] .
Related work. Questions of privacy-preserving data mining and private computation of machine learning algorithms have been considered in several works [19, 40, 48, 71] , providing theoretical protocols without implementations or practical evaluations of their efficiency. Early implementations of privacy-preserving linear regression protocols [21, 65] either don't use formal threat models, or leak additional information beyond the result of the computation.
Hall et al. [35] were the first to propose a protocol for linear regression with formally defined security guarantees. However, due to the dependence on expensive homomorphic encryption, the resulting system does not scale well to large datasets.
Another implementation of linear regression is given by Bogdanov et al. [6] . They compare multiple methods for solving regression problems, including standard Conjugate Gradient Descent. However, they work in a threat model with three computing parties and a honest majority among those. Although they allow for more than three input parties, this means that they cannot handle the two-party case. Furthermore, their evaluation is limited to problems with at most 10 features.
Nikolaenko et al.'s work [59] on secure computation for linear regression is the one most similar to ours. In particular, their approach also considers a protocol split into aggregation and solving phases implemented using multiple MPC primitives. However, Nikolaenko et al. only consider the horizontally-partitioned setting while we focus on the more challenging case of vertically-partitioned datasets. Our implementation of the solving phase using CGD improves the results obtained using Nikolaenko et al.'s secure Cholesky decomposition in terms of both speed and accuracy for datasets with more than 100 features (experiments in [59] were limited to datasets with at most 20 features). Furthermore, our CGD algorithm can also be used directly to improve other MPC protocols requiring a secure linear system solver [33, 35, 59] .
Vertically-partitioned databases have been also studied from the perspective of privacy-preserving querying of statistical databases [22] . This work falls under the paradigm of differential privacy [23] , where the goal is to mitigate the privacy risks incurred by revealing to an attacker the model computed by a machine learning algorithm. Our work addresses an orthogonal concern, namely that of preserving privacy during the computation the model. Combining MPC and differential privacy is an interesting problem we plan to address in future work.
Background
The following two sections provide background on linear regression and MPC techniques that will be used in this paper.
Linear Regression
Linear regression is a fundamental building block of many machine learning algorithms. It produces a model given a training set of sample data points by fitting a linear curve through them. Formally, a linear model is a real-valued function on ddimensional vectors of the form x → θ, x , where x ∈ R d is the input vector, θ ∈ R d is the vector of parameters specifying the model, and θ, x = d j=1 θ j x j is the inner product between θ and x. The term linear comes from the fact that the output predicted by the function θ, x is a linear combination of the features represented in x.
The learning algorithm has access to a training set of samples representing the input-output relation the model should try to replicate. These are denoted as
A standard approach to learn the parameters of a linear model is to solve the ridge regression optimization:
Here, λ θ 2 is known as a ridge (or Tikhonov) regularization term weighted by the regularization parameter λ > 0. When λ = 0, this optimization finds the parameter vector θ minimizing the mean squared error between the predictions made by the model on the training examples x (i) and the desired outputs y (i) . The ridge penalty is used to prevent the model from overfitting when the amount of training data is too small. The optimization problem (1) is convex and its solution admits a closed-form expression. A way to derive this solution is to reformulate the optimization problem by writing X ∈ R n×d for the matrix with n rows corresponding to the different
j , and Y ∈ R n for a column vector with n entries corresponding to the training labels y (i) . With this notation, (1) is equivalent to
Now, by taking the gradient of this objective function and equating it to zero one can see that the optimization (1) reduces to solving this system of linear equations:
where I represents the d × d identity matrix. Therefore, ridge regression reduces to solving a system of linear equations of the form Aθ = b, where the coefficients A = 1 n X X + λI and b = 1 n X Y only depend on the training data (X, Y ). Since the coefficient matrix A is positive definite by construction ridge regression can be solved using one of the many known algorithms for solving positive definite linear systems.
Multi-Party Computation
Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is an area of cryptography concerned with enabling multiple parties to jointly evaluate a public function on their private inputs, without leaking any information about their respective inputs (other than their sizes and whatever can be inferred from the result of the computation). Several generic techniques have been developed for MPC including Yao's garbled circuits protocol [70] , the GMW protocol [31] , and other secret-sharing based techniques [7, 41, 50] . These differ in several aspects including the number of parties they support, the representation they use for the evaluated function (e.g., binary vs. arithmetic circuits), the function families that can be evaluated securely with these solutions (e.g., bounded-degree polynomials vs. arbitrary polynomials), as well trade-offs in terms of communication, computation, and security guarantees that they provide. In Section 3, we keep these differences in mind in order to choose the right MPC techniques for each part of the computation. Popular applications used for the empirical evaluation of practical MPC systems include graph algorithms [5, 32, 42, 51, 57] , data structure algorithms [42, 51] , string matching and distance algorithms [36, 37, 66] and AES [3, 36, 37, 66] .
Other than in Section 7, this paper assumes semi-honest adversaries. Such adversaries are limited to observing the full trace of the protocol execution without influencing it. This contrasts with malicious adversaries, that take complete control of protocol participants, and may deviate from the protocol in arbitrary ways. For detailed definitions of security in both models see Goldreich [30] . To prove security, we use a simulation-based approach [30, 47] where one argues that a protocol is secure if it can be simulated in an ideal environment in which there is no data leakage by definition.
For our solving phase, we use Yao's two-party garbled circuits protocol, which was formally-described and proven secure by Lindell and Pinkas [49] . In its basic form, this protocol provides semi-honest security for computing arbitrary functions represented as a binary circuit. A two-party computation protocol based on garbled circuits has three phases: circuit garbling, input garbling and garbled circuit evaluation. In the first step one of the parties (the garbler) creates a garbled represen-tation of the evaluated Boolean circuit where wire values are represented with cryptographic keys (garbled labels) and the circuit gates are implemented as garbled tables of ciphertexts that are encrypted using the wire labels. The garbled circuit consisting of all garbled gates is provided to the other party (the evaluator) who can evaluate it on the input for which it is given the corresponding input garbled labels. These input garbled values are provided in the input garbling phase. While the garbler can directly send the garbled values for its input bits, the parties need to run an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol [55, 62] to enable the evaluator to obtain the input garbled labels corresponding its input bits without revealing those inputs to the generator.
Protocol description
We consider the problem of solving a ridge regression problem when the training data (X ∈ R n×d , Y ∈ R n ) is distributed vertically (by columns) among several parties. As in previous work on privacy-preserving ridge regression [35, 59] , we assume that the regularization parameter λ is public to all the parties, and hence the implementation of a secure data analysis pipeline including hyper-parameter tuning (e.g., crossvalidation) is beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, we also make the assumption in the vertically partitioned case that the correspondence between the rows in the datasets owned by different parties is known a priori. This assumption is easy to enforce in databases with unique identifiers for each record, given that efficient private set intersection protocols exist. The more complex task of privacy-preserving entity resolution is beyond the scope of this paper.
As discussed in Section 2.1, solving a ridge regression problem reduces to the solution of a positive definite linear system. A superficial inspection of Equation (2) shows that this can be seen as two sequential tasks: (i) compute the matrix A = 1 n X X + λI and the vector b = 1 n X Y , and (ii) solve the system Aθ = b. In the distributed privacy-preserving setting, task (i) above corresponds to an aggregation phase where data held by different parties has to be combined. In contrast, we refer to (ii) as the solving phase, where the system of linear equations resulting from the aggregation is solved and all the parties obtain the solution in some form. It is important to note that in practice, ridge regression is used on problems with n d, and that, while the input of the aggregation phase is of the order of n×d, the solving phase has input size independent of n, i.e., of the order of d 2 . This demonstrates the importance of having an efficient aggregation phase.
As mentioned in the introduction, the scenario where (X, Y ) is partitioned horizontally among the parties was studied by Nikolaenko et al. [59] . With this partitioning, the computation of A and b can be cast as an addition of matrices computed locally by the parties. More concretely, in that case one
The absence of the need for secure multiplication is crucial from a secure computation perspective, and guided the design of the protocol of [59] , as non-linear operations are expensive in secure computation. In contrast, the setting where the data is vertically partitioned requires secure computation of inner products on vectors owned by different parties. In the following section, we analyze the exact requirements for this setting, and propose secure computation protocols to overcome this challenge.
Aggregation Phase
For clarity of presentation, we first describe the two-party case, where X is vertically partitioned among two parties P 1 and P 2 as X 1 and X 2 , and Y is held by one of the parties, say P 2 . As described above, the goal of this phase is to have the parties hold additive shares of (A, b). With this notation, the functionality f of the aggregation phase can be described as follows:
where (A − A 2 , b − b 2 ) and (A 2 , b 2 ) are the outputs received by the first and the second party respectively.
Our protocol implements f in a secure way. Let us now have a closer look at what needs to be computed. For simplicity, assume that each party holds a block of contiguous features. Then, the following equations show how the content of the output matrix depends on the inputs of the two parties.
Observe that the upper left part of the matrix M = X X depends only on the input of party P 1 and the lower right part depends only on the input of party P 2 . Hence, the corresponding entries of M can be computed locally by P 1 , while P 2 simply has to set her shares of those entries to 0. On the other hand, for entries M ij of M such that features i and j are held by distinct parties, the parties need to compute an inner product between a column vector from X 1 and a column vector from X 2 . To do so, we rely on a secure inner product protocol which we present next (Section 3.1.1). We note also that because the two off-diagonal blocks of M are transpositions of each other, computing only one of these blocks is enough to get an additive share of M . In the multi-party case, similarly to the two-party case, the vertical partitioning of the database implies that each party holds a subset of the columns of X and a corresponding subset of the rows of X . Since each value in A is an inner product between a row vector of X and a column vector of X, this means that each value in A depends on the inputs of at most two parties. Thus, also in the multi-party case, the aggregation phase for vertically-partitioned datasets can be reduced to secure two-party computation of inner products. At the end of the aggregation phase, the parties will obtain A in a form where each entry is either known to one party or is shared between some pair of input parties.
Secure Inner Product
In this section, we present protocols for two parties P 1 and P 2 , holding vectors x and y, respectively, to securely compute the inner product of their vectors and obtain additive shares of the result. As mentioned before, we use a fixed-point encoding for real numbers (see Section 4 for details). Thus, our numbers can be represented as elements of a finite field Z q , and hence the functionality we need can be described as
where x, y ∈ Z n q , r is a random element of Z q , and each party gets one of the components of the output. There are several techniques that can be used for this task as, essentially, it corresponds to secure multiplication.
Generally, MPC techniques represent the implemented functionality either as arithmetic circuits (e.g., SPDZ [15] , TinyOT [58] ) or as Boolean circuits (e.g., Yao's protocol [70] , GMW [31] ). While the former makes it possible to represent arithmetic operations very efficiently, the latter is better for performing bit-level operations. A second important property of MPC protocols is round complexity. Most notably, some techniques such as Yao's garbled circuits have a constant number of rounds, while for others (e.g., SPDZ, TinyOT, GMW), the number of rounds increases with the multiplicative depth of the circuit being evaluated (for Boolean circuits, this is the AND-depth). Note that the functionality in Equation (3) only consists of additions and multiplications. Furthermore, all multiplications can be done in parallel. Thus, a representation as an arithmetic circuit with constant multiplicative depth is the natural choice.
We propose two protocols for the functionality in Equation (3). The first is an extension of OT-based secure multiplication, which was originally proposed by Gilboa [29] , and is used in different MPC contexts [18, 41] . It uses OT to compute Parties: P 1 , P 2 , and Trusted Initializer TI. Inputs: P 1 : x ∈ Z n q ; P 2 : y ∈ Z n q . Outputs: P 1 : s 1 ∈ Zq; B : s 2 ∈ Zq such that s 1 + s 2 = x, y .
Protocol:
1. TI generates random vectors a, b ∈ Z n q and a random number r ∈ Zq, and sets z = a, b − r. It sends ( a, r) to P 1 , and ( b, z) to P 2 . 2. P 1 sends x + a to P 2 . 3. P 2 sends y − b to P 1 . 4. P 1 computes its output share as s 1 = x, y − b − r. 5. P 2 computes its output share as s 2 = x + a, b − z. Fig. 1 . Secure two-party inner product/multiplication supported by a trusted initializer. Its security relies on the fact that the TI does not collude with the data providers, as described in Lemma 1.
additive shares of the product of two numbers in a binary field, which can be trivially extended to securely compute the inner product of two vectors.
Our second secure inner product protocol uses only symmetric key operations and is much more efficient than the previous one. It builds upon techniques based on precomputation of multiplicative triples [2] , as the secret sharing techniques mentioned above, and relies on an initializer that aids in the computation. Our protocol can also be seen as a modification of the construction presented by Du and Attalah [20] where the trusted initializer does not keep a share of the result, and is presented in Figure 1 .
In both our protocols, we exploit the facts that, in our case, (i) the input vectors are each completely owned by one of the parties, and not shared among them, (ii) only two-party computations are needed, (ii) we are concerned about semi-honest security at this point. These observations lead to simpler protocols than general MPC protocols based on secret sharing.
In Section 6.3 we present an evaluation of our two protocols for secure inner product, in the context of our implementation of the aggregation phase for secure linear regression.
Solving Phase
After the aggregation phase, the parties hold additive shares of a square, symmetric, positive definite matrix A and a vector b, and the task is to securely solve Aθ = b.
In line with previous work [35, 59] , and in order to achieve constant round-complexity, we choose Yao's garbled circuits for our solving phase, and introduce two additional non-colluding parties. These aid in the computation without learning neither the result, nor anything about the parties' in-Parties: Data providers P 1 . . . , Pn, CSP, and Evaluator. Inputs:
The data providers learn a solution of Aθ = b.
Protocol:
1. The CSP generates a garbled circuit C for a functionality f ((A 1 , b 1 ), . . . , (An, bn)) that reconstructs a solves Aθ = b and sends it to the Evaluator. 2. Each data provider P i runs oblivious transfers with the CSP to obtain garbled values (Â i ,b i ) for (A i , b i ) in C and forwards them to the Evaluator. 3. The Evaluator evaluates C and sharesθ with the data providers. 4. The CSP sends the decryption mappings for the data providers to obtain θ fromθ.
Fig. 2.
The solving phase of our protocol. Its security in the semihonest threat model follows from the security proof for Yao's protocol in [49] .
put. In fact, our architecture relying on two external parties can be seen as a way of reducing a multi-party problem to a twoparty problem, and had been used before in [59] and [56] .
Analogously to the presentation in [59] , we call our additional roles Crypto Service Provider (CSP) and Evaluator. For clarity, from now on, we will call our parties data providers. The CSP is in charge of generating a garbled circuit for solving Aθ = b, while the Evaluator will do the evaluation. In contrast to [59] , the Evaluator does not necessarily learn the solution of the system in our protocol. The solving phase of our protocol is presented in Figure 2 . Note that the CSP and the Evaluator are only required to be non-colluding and hence, for the protocol in Figure 2 , their roles could be taken by some of the data providers. In particular, for the case with two data providers, no additional parties are needed. We discuss security considerations of the solving phase protocol in the next section, where we present our complete protocol for secure linear regression.
Finally, let us note that we have not specified the details of the circuit C yet. It is important to remark that, after having designed a fast aggregation phase, the bottleneck of our protocol in terms of running time will now be in the solving phase. Hence, the concrete algorithm for solving Aθ = b is a crucial element for the scalability of our protocol for secure linear regression. In Sections 5 and 4 we discuss desirable properties of a good algorithm for solving systems of linear equations tailored for MPC, and propose a Conjugate Gradient Descent algorithm. Finally, let us mention that, as we will see in Section 5, the circuit C has high degree. As mentioned in the previous section this motivates the choice of GCs as underlying CSP/TI Evaluator MPC technique. An extensive evaluation of MPC techniques for the task of linear system solving is left for further work.
Secure Linear Regression
Our main protocol is depicted in Figure 3 . In this case, the composition between the aggregation and solving phases is implemented in steps (d) and (e) by means of oblivious transfers between the CSP and the data providers. Here, the roles of Trusted Initializer and CSP in the aggregation and solving phases are taken by a single additional non-colluding party, while the role of the Evaluator could be taken by one of the data providers.
In the two-party case, the roles of the CSP and the Evaluator can be taken by the data providers, and the composition of the two phases is straightforward, while the role of Trusted Initializer in the aggregation phase is taken by an additional non-colluding party that aids in the computation.
A variant of our protocol described above implements the aggregation phase using the protocol based on OT (Section 3.1.1). In this way, we remove the need for an external non-colluding party. We will consider the performance of this variant in the experimental evaluation, and revisit it when we consider extensions of our protocol to withstand malicious adversaries.
Up to this point we have focused on design and correctness aspects of our protocols, without discussing their security guarantees. We undertake that task in the following section.
Security Against Semi-Honest Adversaries
Our work is in the semi-honest -also known as honest-butcurious -threat model. Security in this model does not provide privacy, correctness, or even fairness guarantees if a party deviates from the protocol. However, the semi-honest setting is appropriate for distributed machine learning applications where parties are generally trusted, but should be prevented from sharing their data in the clear for legal reasons, or the computation is run in a controlled environment. This conditions are reasonably easy to meet in scenarions where the parties are corporations or government agencies. In this section we formally argue the correctness of our protocol in the semihonest threat model, and in Section 7 we discuss an extension to guarantee correctness of the result.
Similarly to how we presented our protocols, we argue security of our linear regression protocol with a modular approach, by proving the security of the protocol based on the security of its subprotocols.
Let us thus first argue security of our protocols for the inner product functionality: while for the security of the OTbased protocol we refer the reader to [18, 29] , we state the correctness and security of the protocol based on a Trusted Initializer in the following lemma. Figure 1 is a secure two-party computation protocol against semi-honest adversaries for the functionality f ( x, y) = (r, x, y − r). where ( x, y) and (r, x, y − r) are the inputs and outputs of the parties.
Lemma 1. The protocol in
Proof. Correctness can be easily verified from the definition of the resulting shares. To prove security, we construct simulators Sim 1 and Sim 2 , which simulate the views of the two parties. Sim 1 generates a view for P 1 given x and P 1 's output in the ideal functionality, denoted s * 1 . The message from the TI is simulated as ( a , x, b − s * 1 ), while the message from P 2 is simulated as b , where a , b ∈ U (Z n q ). The resulting view has the same distribution as P 1 's view in the real protocol execution. Similarly, Sim 2 generates a view for P 2 given y and s * 2 as follows: the message from the TI is simulated as ( b , a , b −s * 2 ), while the message from P 1 is simulated as a , where a , b ∈ U (Z n q ). These messages have the same distribution as P 2 's view in the real execution, which completes the proof.
The security of our main protocol depicted in Figure 3 is stated in the following theorem. Informally, the theorem states that, as long as the participants do not deviate from the protocol, and the external parties (CSP/TI and Evaluator) are noncolluding, none of the parties learn anything from the inputs of the data providers that cannot be deduced from the result of the computation, namely the regression parameter θ. Moreover, recall that the external parties do not obtain θ.
Theorem 1 (Security). Let Π 1 be a secure two-party computation protocol for the inner product functionality defined in Section 3.1.1 with security against semi-honest adversaries, and Π 2 be a two-party computation protocol based on garbled circuits with semi-honest security. The construction in Figure 3 is a secure computation protocol that provides security against semi-honest adversaries, in the setting where the CSP/TI and the Evaluator do not collude with neither the data providers nor each other.
Proof. We need to show simulation security against a semihonest non-colluding adversary that controls the CSP, a semihonest non-colluding adversary that controls the Evaluator, and a semi-honest adversary that controls a subset of the input parties.
The security of the inner product protocol Π 1 implies that there exist simulators Sim P1 and Sim P2 which can simulate the view of each of the two parties in the execution of the protocol. The security of the two party computation protocol based on garbled circuits Π 2 implies the existence of simulators Sim garb and Sim eval which work as follows. Sim garb simulates the view of the garbling party, which consists of the execution of the OT protocols as a sender. Sim eval simulated the view of the Evaluator which consists of the garbled circuit itself as well at the view in the execution of the OT protocols as a receiver. We will use these simulators in our proof. Semi-honest CSP. The view of the CSP in the secure computation protocol consists only of the messages exchanged in the garbled circuit computation where it has no input, and the messages exchanged in the OT executions with the data providers. Both can be simulated using Sim garb . Semi-honest Evaluator. Similarly to the case of the CSP, the view of the Evaluator in the execution of the protocol consists of the messages exchanged in the execution of the garbled circuit evaluation where it has no inputs. Therefore, we can use the simulator Sim eval that can simulate its view. Semi-honest Input Parties. The view of an adversary who controls a subset of the input parties in the protocol in Figure 2 consists of the messages exchanged in the executions of the inner product protocol in the aggregation phase with other input parties not controlled by the adversary, the messages in the OT executions with the CSP in the solving phase together with mappings for the output garbled labels as well as the garbled output the parties receive from the Evaluator. We can use the simulators Sim P1 and Sim P2 to obtain the view of the adversary in the aggregation phase. Additionally, we can use Sim garb for Π 2 to simulate the view of the adversary in the OT executions. Given the value θ of the output solution, which the parties will receive, the simulator Sim garb can also generate mappings for the output garbled labels to real values and a set of garbled labels for the output that open to θ. This completes the proof.
The above security argument can be easily adapted to the case where the evaluator is one of the data providers, as long as CSP/TI does not collude with any other party.
We can further extend the security guarantees of our protocol, to the setting where the roles of the CSP and the Evaluator are executed by two of the parties, as long as these two parties are semi-honest and non-colluding with each other. In this scenario, we use the OT-based protocol for the aggregation phase, as it does not require a Trusted Initializer (which was instantiated by the CSP). The security guarantees for this variant in which no external parties are required, are stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 2 (Security without external parties). Let Π be an instantiation of the protocol described in Figure 3 where the roles of CSP and the Evaluator are implemented by two distinct input providers, and the aggregation phase is instantiated with the OT-based inner product protocol. Then, Π provides security against semi-honest adversaries in the setting where the CSP and the Evaluator do not collude.
In Section 6 we provide an experimental evaluation of the protocols of the two theorems above where we quantify the speedup obtained by relying on an offline phase performed by a noncolluding external party acting as Trusted Initializer.
Number Representation
Implementing secure MPC protocols to work with numerical data poses a number of challenges. In our case, the most significant of those challenges is choosing an encoding for numerical data providing a good trade-off between efficiency and accuracy. The IEEE 754 floating-point representation is the standard choice used by virtually every numerical computation software because of its high accuracy and numerical stability when working with numbers across a wide range of orders of magnitude. However, efficient implementations of IEEE 754-compliant secure MPC protocols are a subject of on-going research [17, 61] , with the current state-of-the-art yielding 32 bit floating-point multiplication circuits running in time comparable to computers from the 1960's [68] . Unfortunately, these implementations do not yet scale to the throughput required for data analysis tasks involving large datasets, and forces us to rely on fixed-point encodings like previous work in this area [10, 35, 59] . The rest of this section presents the details of the particular fixed-point encoding used by our system, with a particular emphasis on its effect on the accuracy of the protocol. We further introduce data normalization and scaling steps that play an important role in the context of linear regression.
Fixed-Point Arithmetic
Our use of fixed-point encodings follows closely previous works on secure linear regression [10, 35, 59] . However, unlike these, we provide a formal analysis of the errors such encodings introduce when used to simulate operations on real numbers.
In a fixed-point signed binary encoding scheme each number is represented using a fixed number of bits b. These bits are subsequently split into three parts: one sign bit, b f bits for the fractional part, and b i bits for the integral part, with the ob-
with accuracy 2 −b f . In general, arithmetic operations with fixedpoint numbers can be implemented using signed integer arithmetic, though special care is required to deal with operations that might result in overflow. We point the reader to [24] for an in-depth discussion of fixed-point arithmetic.
In order to implement the secure inner product protocol described in Figure 1 we need to simulate fixed-point arithmetic over a finite ring Z q whose elements can be represented using b bits. Thus, the encoding used by our protocols involves two steps: mapping reals into integers, and mapping integers to integers modulo q with q = 2 b . We introduce encoding and decoding maps for each of these two steps, as summarized in the following diagram:
The map encoding reals into integers is given by φ δ (r) = [r/δ], where the parameter δ = 2 −b f controls the encoding precision and [·] returns the rounding of a real number to the closest integer (with ties favouring the largest integer). In particular, δ is the smallest number that can be represented by our encoding φ δ . The integer decoding mapping is given bỹ φ δ (z) = zδ. Next we recall several well-known facts [24] about the error introduced by operating under a fixed-point encoding with finite precision δ. For any reals r, r ∈ R we have the following:
Note the last fact involves a decoding with precision δ 2 to account for the increase in the number of fractional bits required to represent the product of two fixed-point numbers.
Encoding reals in a bounded interval
This interval contains K = 2M/δ + 1 integers. Thus, it is possible to map this interval injectively into any ring Z q of integers modulo q with q ≥ K. We obtain such injection by defining the encoding map ϕ q (z) = z mod q, which for integers in the range −q/2 ≤ z ≤ q/2 yields ϕ q (z)
Although ϕ q is a ring homomorphism mapping operations in Z into operations in Z q , decoding from Z q to Z after operating on encoded integers might not yield the desired result due to overflows. To avoid such overflows one must check that the result falls in the interval where the coding ϕ q is the inverse ofφ q . In particular, the following properties only hold for integers z, z such that |z|, |z | ≤ q/2:
Accuracy of Inner Product
The properties of the encodings described in the previous section can be used to provide a bound on the accuracy of the result of the inner product protocol given in Figure 1 . At the end of the protocol, both parties have an additive share of of x, y for some integer vectors x, y ∈ Z n q . Therefore, we want to show that when the input vectors x, y provided by the parties are fixed-point encodings of some real vectors u, v ∈ R n , then the result of the inner product over Z q can be decoded into a real number approximating u, v . We note that the comparison here is against real arithmetic, while in the experimental section we will be comparing against floating-point arithmetic, which can represent real arithmetic to high degrees of accuracy across a much larger range of numbers [43] .
According to the previous section, there are two sources of error when working with fixed-point encoded real numbers: the systematic error induced by working with finite precision (which can be mitigated by increasing b f ), and the occasional error that occurs when the numbers in Z q overflow (which can be mitigated by increasing b i ). To control the overflow error we assume that u and v are n-dimensional real vectors with entries bounded by R, |u i |, |v i | ≤ R for i ∈ [n], and x = ϕ q (φ δ ( u)) and y = ϕ q (φ δ ( v)) are encodings of those vectors with precision δ.
Theorem 3 ([69, Ch. 3]).
If q > 2nR 2 /δ 2 , then:
The proof is straightforward and is provided in Appendix A for the sake of completeness. We note that the assumption of a bound R on the entries of the vectors u and v is not very stringent: if both parties agree on a common bound R, or there is a publicly known R, then the vectors can be normalized locally by each party before the execution of the protocol. Thus, in practice it is convenient to normalize the real vectors u and v such that their entries are bounded by C/ √ n for some constant C > 0. In this case, the bounds above can be used to show that if one requires the final inner product to have error at most ε, this can be achieved by taking δ = ε/2C
√ n and q = 8C 2 n/ε 2 . Using these expressions we see that an encoding with b = O(log(n/ε)) bits is enough to achieve accuracy ε when performing n-dimensional inner products with fixedpoint encoded reals.
Data Standardization and Scaling
The statistical theory behind ridge regression generally assumes that the covariates in the columns of X are normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance. In practical applications this is not always satisfied. However, it is a common practice to standardize each column of the training data to have zero mean and unit variance. This column-wise procedure is implemented as part of the local pre-processing done by each party in our linear regression protocol. We useX to denote the data matrix obtained after standardization. The importance of proper data scaling to prevent overflows in the aggregation phase is the key message from Theorem 3 (Section 4.2). Additionally, a critical phenomenon occurring in the solving phase is the degradation in the quality of the solution when the encoding is fixed and the dimension of the linear system grows. To alleviate the effect of the dimension on the accuracy of the solving phase, our pre-processing re-scales every entry inX and Y by
. We note that these scalings can be performed locally by the parties holding each respective column.
The standardization and scaling steps described above imply that our protocols effectively solve the linear system 1 ndX
This scaling has no effect on the linear regression problem being solved beyond changing the scale of the regularization parameter. On the other hand, the standardization step needs to be reversed if one wants to make predictions on test data following the same distribution as the original training data. This task corresponds to a simple linear computation that can be efficiently implemented in MPC, both in the case where the model θ is disclosed to the parties and the case where it is kept shared among the parties and the prediction task using θ is itself implemented in a secure way using MPC.
Solving Linear Systems
As discussed in Section 3.2, the solving phase of our protocol involves solving positive definite linear systems of the form Aθ = b in a garbled circuits protocol. A wide variety of solutions to this problem can be found in the numerical analysis literature, though not all of them are suitable for MPC. For example, any variant of Gaussian elimination involving datadependent pivoting can be immediately ruled out because implementing non-data-oblivious algorithms inside garbled circuits produces unnecessary blow-ups in the circuit size. This limitation has already been recognized by previous works on private linear regression using garbled circuits and other MPC techniques [35, 59] . In particular, these works consider two main alternatives: computing the full inverse of A, or solving the linear system directly using the Cholesky decomposition of A as an intermediate step. Although both of these methods have an asymptotic computational cost of O(d 3 ), in practice Cholesky is faster and numerically more stable. This justifies the choice of Cholesky as a procedure for solving linear systems in garbled circuits made in [59] . However, as we show in Section 6.2, Cholesky's cubic cost in the dimension can become prohibitive when working with high-dimensional data, in which case one must resort to iterative approximate algorithms like Conjugate Gradient Descent (CGD).
In the following Section we present a novel CGD algorithm tailored for working with fixed-point arithmetic and compare it to the classical CGD algorithm.
Conjugate Gradient Descent
Factorizing the coefficient matrix A in order to make the solution easier to compute, as in Cholesky's algorithm, is not the only efficient way to solve a system of linear equations. An entirely different approach relies on iterative algorithms which construct a monotonically improving sequence of approximate solutions θ t converging to the desired solution. The main virtue of iterative algorithms is the possibility to reduce the cost of solving the system below the cubic complexity required by exact algorithms at the expense of providing only an approximate solution. In particular, for linear systems arising from ridge regression the practical importance of iterative algorithms is twofold: since intensive computations inside an MPC framework can be expensive, iterative methods provide a natural way to spend a fixed computational budget on finding an approximation to the desired solution by stopping after a fixed number of iterations; and, since the coefficients of the linear system occurring in ridge regression are inherently noisy because they are computed from a finite amount of data, finding an approximate solution whose accuracy is on the same order of magnitude as the noise in the coefficients is generally sufficient for optimizing the predictive performance of the model.
When the coefficient matrix of the linear system Aθ = b is positive definite, a popular iterative method is the conjugate gradient descent (CGD) algorithm. The CGD algorithm can be interpreted as solving the system by iteratively minimizing the objective Aθ − b 2 with respect to the parameter vector θ using the method of conjugate gradients [60] . However, the numerical stability of CGD is in general worse than that of Cholesky's algorithm, making it very sensitive to the choice of fixed-point encoding. This can be observed in Figure 4 (left), where we plot the behavior of the residual Aθ t − b as a function of t for several settings of the number of number of integer bits b i when solving a system with d = 50 using 64-bit fixed-point encodings. This plot shows that CGD is very sensitive to the choice of b i , and even in the optimal setting (b i = 10) the convergence rate is much slower than the one achieved by the corresponding floating-point implementation (dashed black curve).
After a thorough investigation of the behavior of a fixedpoint implementation of CGD we concluded that the main problem occurs when the norm of the conjugate gradients decreases too fast and consequently the step sizes grow at each iteration. This motivates a variant of CGD, which we call fixedpoint CGD (FP-CGD), and whose pseudo-code is given in Figure 5 . The only difference between standard CGD and FP-CGD is the use of normalized gradientsg t = g t / g t ∞ in the computation of the conjugate search directions p t ; in particular, by takingg t = g t one recovers the classical textbook Algorithm: algorithm. While CGD has been used in the context of secure computation in previous work [6] , to the best of our knowledge, this modification of CGD has not been considered in the literature before.
It is easy to show that CGD and FP-CGD produce exactly the same sequence of approximate solutions θ t when working in exact arithmetic. However, normalizing the search directions in FP-CGD makes the method much more stable with respect to the errors introduced by fixed-point arithmetic. This is illustrated by Figure 4 (right) , where we show the evolution of the residuals for the same system and fixed-point encodings that we used to test standard CGD. Here, we observe that we recover the same converge rate as CGD with floating-point arithmetic while only suffering a loss between 2 and 3 digits of accuracy. We will see later in our experiments with real data (Section 6.4) that this loss in accuracy is negligible in real applications, and it is comparable (or better) than the accuracy provided by a fixed-point implementation of Cholesky's method. In terms of computation, we note that each iteration of FP-CGD is slightly more expensive than an iteration of standard CGD due to the normalization step, but the asymptotic cost per iteration is in Θ(d 2 ) in both cases.
Further justificiation for the use of FP-CGD instead of other iterative methods is provided by its favorable theoretical properties. In exact arithmetic, FP-CGD inherits two important properties from CGD: (i) it converges to the exact solution of Aθ = b in exactly d iterations; and (ii) it achieves the optimal convergence rate among all first-order methods, yielding a solution with error at most ε after O( κ(A) log(1/ε)) iterations. Property (i) is important because not all iterative algorithms for solving linear systems are guaranteed to produce an exact solution after a finite number of iterations, including standard gradient descent methods like the ones implemented in [33] using leveled homomorphic encryption. Furthermore, property (ii) says essentially that it is not possible to find a first-order method producing more accurate approximate solutions than CGD, and that only a few iterations of CGD are required to accurately solve linear systems with small condition number κ(A). In principle, these properties might not be preserved by the fixed-point implementations of CGD and FP-CGD due to the numerical errors introduced by the finiteprecision arithmetic. In the case of CGD, [52] shows that when working with a finite number of bits for the fractional part and an infinite number of bits for the integer part, several important properties of the exact version, including the convergence rate, are preserved up to small order modifications. However, the assumption of infinite bits for the integer part is not realistic in practice, and the experiments in Figure 4 show that when a fixed number of bits needs to be split between the integer and fractional part of the representation a crucial tension arises. FP-CGD is designed to alleviate such tension by making sure that a minimal number of bits in the integer part suffice to solve a properly scaled system accurately. We demonstrate this through our experimental evaluations in Section 6, where we also compare the accuracy and running time of FP-CGD against the method based in Cholesky decomposition used in [59] , and study the effect of the condition number κ(A) on both methods.
Experimental Results
This section presents an extensive empirical evaluation of our protocols. We start by describing the details about the concrete implementation of our system and the experimental setup. Then we present experiments for different implementations of the solving phase using FP-CGD and Cholesky, comparing them in terms of accuracy and running time across a wide range of settings. The second set of experiments evaluates two implementations for the aggregation phase: one based on the inner product protocol relying on a trusted initializer, and the one based on OT. Finally, we present an evaluation of the complete system on nine real datasets from the UCI repository with different algorithms in the solving phase and compare the resulting predictive performance of the learned model against the performance obtained in the non-private setting. Overall, our experiments highlight the importance of using FP-CGD for high-dimensional data, and provide a guide on how to choose a good fixed-point encoding depending on the characteristics of the problem.
Implementation and Setup
We implemented our MPC protocols using Obliv-C [72] , an extension of the C programming language for secure computation. Obliv-C includes an implementation of Yao's garbled circuit protocol that incorporates recent optimizations including free XOR [44] , garbled row reduction [56] , fixed key block ciphers [3] , and half gates [73] . Further, it features efficient implementations of OT extension, including variants such as correlated OT [1] .
To support arbitrary precision arithmetic, we implemented a big integer library [74] for multi-party computation as an extension of Obliv-C. This library composes an arbitrary number of garbled integers to represent larger integer values in two's complement binary. It features standard operations such as comparisons, bit manipulation and shifts, and arithmetic functions including addition, multiplication, integer division and modulo computation. All the arithmetic operations are implemented using common, efficient algorithms for extended precision arithmetic; in particular, we implement the KaratsubaComba [39] method for multiplication, and Knuth's algorithm D [43] for division.
For fixed-point arithmetic, we implement two variants of our protocols. One uses Obliv-C's native integer types to represent fixed-point numbers. Since for fixed-point multiplication, the bit width of intermediate values can be large as the sum of the arguments' bit widths, this version is limited to 32-bit numbers. Our second fixed-point implementation uses the big integer library described above, allowing to represent numbers with arbitrary precision. This arrangement incurs some overhead relative to using Obliv-C's native types. However, this overhead is justified in cases where 32-bit arithmetic introduces large errors. Although in principle, our second implementation allows for an arbitrary number of bits, we only evaluate it with 64 bit numbers. As the results in Section 6.4 show, this is enough to get accurate results on real datasets.
For the solving phase, we implemented the Cholesky and FP-CGD methods described by Nikolaenko et al. [59] and Section 5, respectively. Cholesky descomposition requires square root computation. Nikolaenko et al. use an iterative algorithm for computing square roots in garbled circuits based on Newton's method. Our implementation of Cholesky's method follows closely their approach and is based on the pseudo-code given in [59] .
For the experiments in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, where each phase of the protocol is evaluated separately, we use synthetically generated data. For each setting of d and n, we sample n data points x (i) from a standard d-dimensional Gaussian distribution and a d-dimensional vector of parameters θ * with independent coordinates sampled uniformly in the interval [0, 1]. The training labels are obtained as
where (i) is a noise term sampled from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance σ 2 = 0.1. The regularization parameter in the solving phase is set to λ = σ 2 d/n θ * 2 , which is the optimal choice suggested by the statistical theory of ridge regression.
For the experiments with synthetic data using 64 and 32 bit fixed-point encodings we used 60 and 28 bits for the fractional part, respectively. In the experiments with real data, the split between the fractional and integer part of the fixed-point encoding was optimized individually for each problem to obtain the best predictive performance.
The experiments were executed using Amazon EC2 C4 instances, each having 4 CPU cores, 7.5 GiB of RAM and 1 Gbps bandwidth. All our code, including the programs used for synthetic data generation, is publicly available under open source licenses [75]. (Figure 7) .
Solving Phase
Next, we compare both algorithms in terms of accuracy of the results. Here, the error is measured using the Euclidean distance to the optimal solution, obtained via floating-point computation. Figure 6 (middle) shows how the accuracy of the result is affected by the condition number of the input matrix A, comparing Cholesky with FP-CGD for varying numbers of iterations on problems with d = 20. We observed that FP-CGD achieves the same accuracy as Cholesky in the 64-bit version, and has even lower error when using only 32 bits. Moreover, the influence of the input condition number decreases with the number of iterations. After convergence, the error remains the same for all tested condition numbers. This advantage over Cholesky increases with higher d, as is shown in Figure 6 (right). For both the 32-bit and 64-bit versions, FP-CGD is more accurate than Cholesky as soon as d > 50. Table 1 shows a comparison between the running times of the 64-bit versions of our two aggregation protocols: OT is the protocol using the OT-based inner product protocol, and TI is the protocol that leverages a Trusted Initializer for the inner product protocol. We vary the number of records, n, from 50,000 up to one million, and the number of features, d, from 20 to 200. As expected, the protocol that takes advantage of the Trusted Initializer performs significantly better in all cases. However, since the TI's resources are the bottleneck in this setting, the protocol does not scale well to multiple data providers, as the fraction of the coefficient matrix A that can be computed locally shrinks as the number of parties increases. The OT-based version, on the other hand, handles many parties very well, due to the fact that OTs between different pairs of parties can be performed in parallel. Timing results our protocols for the aggregation phase for a more extensive set of configurations can be found in Tables 4 and 5 of Appendix B.
Aggregation Phase
As a baseline, we implemented a garbled circuit protocol for performing a single inner product in Obliv-C. The running time for n = 10 6 was over 90 minutes. This implies that our protocol outperforms this naïve approach by several orders of magnitude. 
Experiments on Real Datasets
Although we have discussed the accuracy of our aggregation and solving protocols independently, we still have to evaluate our protocol in the task of building a ridge regression model. We evaluate our secure multi-party ridge regression system on 9 different regression problems selected from the UCI repository [46] . Each problem comes with a set of n examples of some dimension d which are randomly split into training (70%) and test sets (30%). Details about the names, original references where the dataset appeared, dimensions and number of examples in each task are given in Table 2 . The dimensions of the problems range from 7 to 384, and the number of training examples ranges from over 200 to almost 3 million.
Examples in the test set are used to evaluate the predictive accuracy of the learned models in terms of their root mean squared error (RMSE). The predictive accuracy of the model will depend on the particular regularization parameter λ used in the regression: larger values prevent overfitting and should be used on small datasets, while smaller values reduce the bias in the regression and should be used on large datasets. Hyperparameter tuning algorithms can use a set of test examples to evaluate the predictive power obtained with different regularization parameters and find a near-optimal setting. In principle, any hyper-parameter tuning algorithm based on solving the regression multiple times with different regularization parameters could be run on top of our system at the cost of executing the protocol repeatedly. This would involve many repeated computations but it is also possible to design a variation of our protocol to avoid most of these repetitions, in particular the computation of X X. We leave this optimization for future work and concentrate on evaluating our ridge regression protocol with a fixed regularization λ for each problem selected a priori using the given train and test split. Table 2 gives the values selected for each task in addition to the condition number of the resulting linear system.
In each case, the features were split evenly between two parties. The scalings and normalizations described in Section 4.3 are performed locally by each party during the aggregation phase. We use the version of our protocol with the aggregation phase implemented using the inner product protocol of Figure 1 , and the reported bit width of 32 or 64 bits in each case. We compare four implementations for the solving phase: Cholesky and Fixed-Point CGD, both in their 32 and 64 bits versions. In the case of CGD, we fixed the number of iterations to 20, regardless of the dimension or any other feature of the problem. For each task, we select the number of bits b f for the fractional part in order to make sure we have enough bits b i in the integer part for representing the largest coefficient appearing in the linear system (A, b). The particular settings for each problem are also given in Table 2 .
The results are presented in Table 3 . We give the total running time of the protocol and RMSE on the test set for each of the four different implementations of the solving phase. The RMSE of each algorithm is compared to the one obtained using an insecure ridge regression algorithm implemented in Matlab that uses 64-bit floating-point representations (given in the column headed Optimal). The percentages in parentheses next to each RMSE give the relative increase -or in very few cases, decrease -on the error incurred using the private algorithm. Remarkably, the differences in accuracy are almost negligible for both 64 bit implementations, while in the 32 bit implementations, CGD is better than Cholesky except in one task.
In terms of running time, we note that both bit settings observe the same pattern: Cholesky is faster for small dimensions d ≤ 100, and CGD is faster for large dimensions d > 100. However, even in the cases where Cholesky is faster, CGD is not far behind (a bit over 3 minutes in the worst case). On the other hand, in the cases where CGD is faster Cholseky has prohibitive running times, e.g., CGD takes ∼ 4h on the largest problem (d = 384) while Cholesky takes practically half a day.
Overall, we observe that for except for the last task, Fixedpoint CGD with 32 bits always obtains relative errors below 1% and runs in less than 45 minutes, thus offering a very competitive solution. For the last dataset, that has large number of training examples, 64 bits are required to achieve good accuracies, mainly due to the errors introduced in the aggregation phase when the number of examples is large and there are not enough bits to represent the intermediate values of the computation of X X with sufficient precision. A possible workaround to this problem would require having a different number of bits in the aggregation and solving phases; we will consider this optimization in future work.
Beyond Semi-Honest Security
The protocols that we discussed in Section 3 guarantee security in an adversarial setting where all parties, including the data providers, the CSP, and the Evaluator, are semi-honest, and the CSP and the Evaluator do not collude. While security against semi-honest adversaries may be enough in a federated learning setting as argued in Section 3.3.1, some applications require stronger guarantees.
In this section, we propose an extension of our protocol that allows the data providers to check the correctness of the result of the second phase, which is computed by CSP and Evaluator. This correctness check works even if one of these two is malicious, or actively corrupted, i.e., they may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol description. We stress, however, that this correctness check is not enough to satisfy the definition of security against malicious adversaries as given by Goldreich [30] . In particular, a malicious CSP can cause the correctness check to succeed or fail depending only on one of the parties' private inputs. This selective failure attack has been discussed thoroughly in the context of garbled circuits [38, 53] .
Our correctness check comes in the form of a third phase, which we call the verification phase. It is implemented using another small garbled circuit, which is secure against malicious adversaries. The general idea of using a tailored, lightweight verification procedure with high security guaran- Table 2 . Specifications of UCI datasets considered in our evaluation. The number of samples n is split randomly into training (70%) and test sets (30%). For each dataset, the regularization parameter λ and the number of fractional bits b f were chosen as described in Section 6.1. The condition number κ was computed after data standardization and scaling (Section 4.3). Table 3 . Results of the evaluation of our system on UCI datasets. For each choice of algorithm and bit width, running time is reported, and the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the solution obtained by our system and an insecure implementation of ridge regression using floating point are compared.
tees to ensure correctness of a protocol with semi-honest security has been used by de Hoogh et. al. [16] for linear programming, Laud and Pettai [45] for sorting, and Nikolaenko et al. [59] for ridge regression.
The Verification Phase
First, note that for the aggregation phase, we need to use the inner product protocol based on OT (Section 3.1.1), since we can no longer assume that the CSP can act as a trusted initializer. Since neither the CSP nor Evaluator take part in this aggregation phase, it needs no further analysis. Nikolaenko et al. [59] made a perceptive observation that in the setting of linear regression, the correctness of the result can be verified simply by checking that the solution θ of the system Aθ = b indeed minimizes the least squares expression of equation (1) . This is done by verifying that θ evaluates to 0 in the derivative of the least squares function in equation (2), which is much cheaper than computing θ with malicious security. Concretely, this means checking that 2(Aθ − b) = 0.
As we are working with finite-precision arithmetic, the equality check must be approximated as 2(Aθ − b) ∈ [−u, u], for some u chosen by the parties. We assume that the election of u is done correctly, in the sense that, if the CSP does not deviate from the protocol, then 2(Aθ − b) ∈ [−u, u] holds. If we consider the infinity norm, then the verification check of a solution θ, corresponds to checking
where v = Aθ − b, and A, b are additively shared among the data providers as (A 1 , b 1 ) , . . . , (A k , b k ) as a result of the aggregation phase. We call this check the verification phase, which is run after the solving phase. Hence, as mentioned above, we use a semi-honest protocol for the solving phase, and then run a verification protocol with malicious security. In our protocol for the semi-honest case of Figure 3 , θ is revealed to the data providers as a result of the solving phase. Consequently, an additive share of v in (4) can be precomputed locally by the parties, and hence securely evaluating (4) only requires additions and comparisons. Using this, we implemented the verification phase as follows. , and then run a two-party garbled circuit protocol with malicious security. In the circuit, v = v 1 + v 2 is recovered, and a single bit is returned, indicating whether (4) holds. 3. CSP and Evaluator send the result of the verification circuit to all data providers.
Note that since not both CSP and Evaluator cannot be malicious at the same time, the parties only need to check if both bits they received are 1.
We implemented and evaluated the garbled circuit with malicious security for this verification phase, as an extension for our solving phase, using the EMP framework [67] . As expected, it runs extremely fast: in our experiments, garbling and execution took less than 3 seconds for d ≤ 500. This is in contrast with the time needed for the solving phase for d = 500: 30 minutes, for 10 iterations of CGD and a bit width of 32 bits (see Figure 6 , left).
Discussion
The problem of securely running machine learning algorithms when the training data is distributed among several parties is an important milestone for the development of privacypreserving data analysis tools. In this paper, we focus on a linear regression task widely used in practical applications. Beyond the settings described in this paper, our implementation of secure conjugate gradient descent with fixed-point arithmetic and early stopping can also be used to deal with non-linear regression problems based on kernel ridge regression, given MPC protocols for evaluating kernel functions typically used in machine learning. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 3, an extensive evaluation of MPC techniques for the task of linear system solving, including our conjugate gradient descent algorithm, is an interesting continuation of the work proposed here. From a more theoretical perspective, the problem of providing security guarantees against malicious adversaries for approximate MPC functionalities poses interesting open challenges both in general and from the perspective of concrete machine learning tasks.
A Proof from Section 4.2
Theorem 3. If q > 2nR 2 /δ 2 , then:
Proof. In the first place we observe that any number occurring in the computation of the inner product φ δ ( u), φ δ ( v) of the integer encodings of u and v is bounded by nR 2 /δ 2 . Therefore, the condition on q ensures there are no overflows in the computation in Z q and we have φ δ (u), φ δ (v) =φ q ( x, y ). Now we use the formulas for the error of sum and product of integer encodings from previous section to show that
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B Further Experimental Results
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